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Financial regimes, financialization patterns and industrial 
performances: preliminary remarks  
Giovanni Dosi, Valérie Revest, Alessandro Sapio 
 
Introduction 
Innovation concerns processes of learning and discovery about new products, new production and new 
forms of economic organization. In turn, search efforts by business firms are shaped also by the rates 
and criteria by which financial markets and financial institutions allocate resources to enterprises 
themselves. Yet, we still do not know much about the specificities of the links between finance and the 
microeconomics of innovation. While the widespread belief is that innovation needs finance, its role 
varies widely according to the size and the age of the innovative firm, as well as the sector and the 
stage of the life cycle of an industry.  
While the great majority of studies have focused on the links between finance and growth 
from a very stylized macroeconomic perspective, relying on international comparisons with not much 
attention to the institutional details (see for instance Levine, 2003), there is indeed an older literature 
which tries to identify “ideal types” in terms of specificities of the main financing channels (banks, 
stock markets, private equity), pioneered by Rybczynski (1974) and Zysman (1984) who distinguished 
two archetypal financial systems, namely “market-based” versus “credit-based” systems.  
We discuss some implications in terms of innovation and evolutionary dynamics of the two 
systems in Dosi (1990). Distinctive features include the relatively “impersonal” relations of the 
market-based archetype as opposed to the more institutionalized ownership/control relationships in the 
credit-based system. Mapping the distinct archetypes in different historical experiences, we also 
conjectured that the credit-based system might have been more conducive to cumulative learning, 
while market-based systems might have fitted more the exploration of new technological paradigms.  
Yet, 25 years after, financial systems have undergone major transformations, that go under the 
rubric of financialization, possibly challenging the current relevance of the distinction between the two 
archetypes. In what follows, we offer a preliminary assessment of the recent changes in financial 
systems and their impact on the nexus between financial set-ups and industrial dynamics.  
The first section recalls the results and conjectures presented in Dosi (1990), centered on an 
“evolutionary taxonomy” of the two financial archetypes and on their comparative dynamic properties. 
The second section reviews the evidence on the role of finance in driving industry-level and firm-level 
innovation and growth. In Section 3 we explore the financialization process and its spread from the 
                                                            We gratefully acknowledge support by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation under grant agreement No. 649186-ISIGrowth. We are also grateful to to Angelo Riva for his reading suggestions. 
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Anglo-Saxon world also to economies which have been historically nearer the “credit-based” 
archetype. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. The evolutionary properties of different financial systems 
In Dosi (1990), one revisited the old question: “Do financial institutions matter in terms of 
levels and changes in real aggregate variables?” There are complementary sides to the answer. One is 
more macro and concerns the role of specific financial institutions, or lack thereof, stimulating or 
impeding long-term economic development (the question dates back at least to Kindleberger, 1984). 
The other side of the answer regards the modes through which industrial growth is financed. In this 
respect, Rybczynski (1974) proposed, as mentioned, a taxonomy which differentiates “market-based” 
systems from “credit-based” systems. In the first system, with the USA and UK as prime examples, 
corporate growth is more frequently financed through traded shares and retained profits. In the second 
archetype, which points to the experience of continental Europe (especially Germany) and Japan, long-
term bank loans and long-term ownership claims by banks and other financial institutions are 
suggested to be relatively more important  sources of corporate financing. In turn, the particular forms 
of ownership and finance are likely to affect the microeconomic patterns of production, investment 
and search and, ultimately, performance outcomes, even when firms face the same set of economic 
incentives.  
1.1 The evolutionary taxonomy of financial systems 
For the most orthodox part of the literature, real aggregate dynamics is unaffected by the 
specific blend of financial institutions catering to business. Rational agents have access to all available 
information and succeed in exploiting all the available opportunities. Thus aggregate dynamics is just 
influenced by the exogenous dynamics of the economic fundamentals. Yet, it is sufficient to relax the 
assumption of perfect information, to show that specific institutions matter in that they convey 
information, generate incentives and guide the allocation of resources. This entails some 
consequences: (i) incentives, allocations, and performances rest on the institutional set-up of each 
system; (ii) equilibria depend on the specific information flows and on the beliefs of agents, and may 
yield Pareto dominated allocations with resource rationing and absence of market clearing; (iii) 
learning processes generally engender non-convexities, multiplicity or even non-existence of 
equilibria.  
The monumental work by Stiglitz and Greenwald (2014) amply discusses these ubiquitous 
properties, which, just more so, apply to evolutionary environments, whereby previously unknown 
states of the world are themselves the result of the innovative activities  of the agents. 
 Innovative processes in such non-stationary worlds are characterized by knowledge tacitness, 
and are path-dependent and institution-dependent (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988; Dosi and 
Nelson, 2010). Agents search on the grounds of what they already know or believe to know, make 
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mistakes, obtain unexpected successes. Collectively, product markets and financial markets operate as 
selection devices among different firms embodying different technologies. Aggregate performances of 
the system change over time as self-organizing collective properties of the interactions amongst 
diverse agents typically under disequilibrium conditions. 
Ultimately, innovative environments are driven by two processes, namely learning and 
selection. Indeed, the differences in structures and performances across industries can be understood as 
the outcomes of the different balances between, and modes of such processes. And finance of course 
matters in so far as it affects firms’ learning patterns, the allocation of resources to different 
organizations carrying different technologies and strategies, and different competitive dynamics across 
firms. 
 Financial selection should plausibly satisfy some weak efficiency criterion and reward/punish 
according to revealed performances. Nevertheless, in non-stationary evolutionary worlds, long-term 
aggregate performance might not be monotonic into the efficiency of the selection rules used by 
financial investors. It could well be that departures from criteria of efficiency based upon past and 
present environments might be necessary in order to nurture future innovativeness. Consequently, 
financial systems may face permanent dilemmas between efficiency and evolutionary viability 
(allowing that some innovation will emerge in the future and turn out to be fitter in that future 
environment). In other words, there exist trade-offs between static efficiency (the opportunity costs of 
given resources at any one time) and Schumpeterian efficiency (the ability of economic systems to 
continuously generate innovation and adapt to unforeseen changes). Empirical environments will 
probably fall between two extreme scenarios whereby in one, the technological winner today would  
be with probability one also  the winner of tomorrow, and in the other, today's winners are going to be 
for sure tomorrow losers. Hence, the financial system is permanently facing a dilemma between 
making the best use of today’s information and resources, on one side, and gamble on unexplored 
opportunities on the other side.  
In Dosi (1990), one explored the two “market-based” and “credit-based” archetypes of 
financial systems in such an evolutionary perspective. A market-based system can be described as a 
relatively “impersonal” system of exchanges of ownership titles. Credit-based systems involve more 
“institutionalized” ownership/control relationships. Using Hirschman's dichotomy, market-based 
financing relies more on exit mechanisms, while credit-oriented systems rely more on voice 
mechanisms, based on the possibility for partners to exchange information, discuss, and negotiate 
(Hirschman, 1970). Taking into account the features of the innovation process (collective, cumulative, 
tacit, uncertain), the financial allocation mechanism itself might involve specific competencies, 
especially in credit-based systems, wherein learning is going to be relatively more important than 
selection. On the other side, market-based systems seem to lead more easily to the exploration of new 
technological paradigms, under the important caveats that innovative opportunities must be high and 
innovative capabilities must be quite diffused throughout the economy.  
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No matter in which system, long-term dynamism requires the persistent exploration of new 
potential paradigms and new technological trajectories. In some market-led systems, allocation of 
resources to innovative search have become institutionally disconnected from the “normal” credit 
activities with the emergence and development of venture capital markets. Venture capital is an 
institutional innovation that, in principle, ought to increase the allocating competences of "specialized 
investors", and reduces uncertainty by spreading risks over investment portfolios. In credit-based 
countries, the financing channel historically has been much less split up. Banks have been important 
for both processes of support to the growth and learning of incumbents and exploration by new 
entrants.  Moreover, in countries like Japan the exploration of new products, processes, and 
organizational arrangements has been historically inbuilt within the dynamic capabilities of large 
established companies.  
Note also that whatever the nature of the financial system (whether nearer the idealized credit-
based system or the pure market-based system), a great part of business-performed innovative search 
has historically gone on (and continues to do so) in established firms. In turn, incumbent firms access 
external financial resources, when they need it, as whole entities, on the grounds of their global 
performance, and not with respect to individual projects.  
To sum up, and with the foregoing caveats in mind, in a Schumpeterian perspective the 
differences between the two systems of financial allocation is based on the relative importance of 
learning versus selection; voice versus exit; discretionary versus non- discretionary allocative rules. 
 
1.2 Dynamic properties  
By way of assessing the properties of the different architectures of the finance-industry nexus, 
Dosi (1990) put forward three conjectures, based on the historical evidence: 
i) The more knowledge is asymmetric, appropriable and scarce, the more 
institutionalized processes of finance allocation will be conducive to evolutionary 
viability. Formal bank-industry relationships have historically appeared to be the 
general case in industrializing countries, which require long-term commitments of 
resources to the accumulation of technological competences which often in catching-
up countries are not there yet. 
ii) A necessary, even if not sufficient, condition for the “Schumpeterian efficiency” of a 
market-based system is that it operates in a country which is on or near the 
technological frontier.  
iii) Financial institutions in credit-based systems, in primis banks, in order to be 
dynamically viable need not only to be “patient”, but need to acquire a relatively 
detailed knowledge about the trajectories of progress of individual industries and also  
about the internal competences and the innovative projects of individual firms.  
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Table 1 presents some distinctive properties of different stylized financial systems. 
Table 1: An evolutionary taxonomy of financial systems and their properties 
Properties systems « Market-Based systems »  « Credit based systems » 
Selective pressure on the grounds of revealed performances  Trial-and-error processes through birth of new firms  “Voice” versus “exit” processes of change  Opportunities of cumulative learning  Discretionality of allocative processes  Specialisation of competences by financial allocators  “Specialisation” versus “diversification” of incumbent firms 
Higher    Higher    Exit   Lower   Lower   lower    More specialisation 
Lower    Lower    Voice   Higher   Higher   Higher    More diversification 
 
 Source: Dosi (1990, p. 315). 
 
On the selection side, similar financial indicators across financial systems may bear different 
implications for dynamic performances. One would also expect that, other things being equal, in credit 
based systems industrial growth will occur more via diversification of existing companies, while in 
market-based systems the pressure to specialize in highly profitable activities will be greater.  One can 
presume that, the more financial markets matter and the more efficient they are, the higher will be the 
pressure against uncompetitive activities and firms.  
Generally, the “Schumpeterian” implication of the distinction between market-based and 
credit-based economies is that the former ought to be comparatively more engaged in technological 
exploration and be relatively more exposed to market selection pressures. Does the evidence bear this 
conjecture, also in the light of the institutional transformations in the international financial sector? 
The next section shall review the empirical nexus between finance, innovation, and industrial 
dynamics, drawing on evidence produced in the last 25 years.  
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2. An empirical overview on the relationship between financial conditions, and firm-
level innovation and growth 
Let us begin with some, both reasonable and misleading, proxies for “market-basedness”. 
 
2.1 The elusive proxies for financial development 
The common practice of equating stock market capitalization with the degrees of “financial 
development”, as done by Levine (1997) and references therein, has been criticized from within the 
very mainstream camp that generated it. Champonnois (2010) argues that the indicators of aggregate 
financial structure are endogenous to the firm ecology and the associated patterns of financing 
decisions. Koetter and Wedow (2010) remark that most studies in this field are unable to measure the 
quality of financial intermediation. Far from being merely an econometric issue, this difficulty is 
rooted in the impossibility to codify all the relevant information, a problem (roughly) addressed by 
credit-based systems through long-term networks of relations between financial agents and firms. 
Arcand et al. (2015) have observed a negative finance-growth nexus for high-income countries, 
motivating them to talk of a “vanishing effect of financial development”. High income countries may 
have reached the point at which financial depth no longer allows to increase the efficiency of 
investments (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011): on the contrary it may even be harmful, e.g. because it 
diverts talented individuals from innovative industries. As argued by Arcand et al. (2015), “There are 
several countries for which smaller financial sectors would actually be desirable”.  
Basically, even in the mainstream quarter there is the acknowledgment that more developed 
financial markets are neither a sign of a higher level of development, nor a harbinger of more growth 
in the future (see also Levine, 2003). Indeed any reasonable observer of the links between financial 
innovation as “weapon of mass destruction” (Warren Buffett dixit) and the 2008 crisis witness that the 
statement is just non surprising common sense. 
Aglietta and Scialom (2010), for instance, illustrate very well how financial innovations have 
generated predatory behaviors and triggered the 2008 crisis. “In the so-called ‘subprime’ crisis, a 
powerful pro-cyclical dynamic was engineered by the intimate interaction of a host of financial 
innovations: mark-to-market of a wide range of financial assets that has enhanced credit against 
collateral, widespread use of credit derivatives that has allowed the securitization of about any type of 
credit, internal models of credit risk control based upon the Value-at-Risk (VaR) principle that has 
immoderately propelled leveraged trading portfolios” (p. 43). 
Granted that, let us move on to assessing the differences in Schumpeterian efficiency, in any, 
across different archetypes of capitalism and “forms of regulation” (Boyer, 2005). 
2.2 Radical innovation across varieties of capitalism 
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Building upon older approaches in comparative economics and upon the French “Regulation” 
School – with degrees of acknowledgment - the literature on the “varieties of capitalisms” (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001) draws a distinction between liberalized market economies (LMEs) and coordinated 
market economies (CMEs). In LMEs, the coordination of individual decisions is mainly entrusted to 
markets, whereas non-market mechanisms, entailing a higher degree of centralization, characterize 
CMEs. Following Hall and Soskice (2001), economies can be clustered along two dimensions: stock 
market capitalization (higher in LMEs) and employment protection (higher in CMEs). Credit-based 
economies tend to fall within the CME category, whereas market-based financial systems are typical 
of LMEs.1 Hall and Soskice (2001) went on to hypothesize a mapping between varieties of capitalism 
and technological comparative advantage. Specifically, they claimed that LMEs specialize in radical 
innovation, whereas CMEs have a comparative advantage in incremental innovation. This resonates 
somewhat with our foregoing evolutionary taxonomy. 
The first test of the Hall-Soskice hypothesis was provided by the authors themselves in their 
2001 book. They compared the aggregate number of patents granted to German and US firms in 
“radical innovation” industries (biotechnology, semiconductors, software, telecommunication 
equipment) and in “incremental innovation” industries (machine tools, consumer durables, engines, 
specialized transport equipment). LMEs were found to prevail in terms of patents granted to firms 
operating in “radically innovative” sectors. Relying on similar notions of “radicality”, Allen et al. 
(2006) and Schneider and Paunescu (2012) found that LMEs export more heavily in high-tech 
industries. These results would indirectly testify to the higher propensity of economies with market-
based financial systems to explore new technological paradigms.  
Tests of the Hall-Soskice hypothesis were subsequently refined, partly refuting the original 
results. Taking the CME-LME taxonomy for granted, the analysis was recast at the industry level of 
aggregation, and arguably better indicators of radicality were proposed. Taylor (2004) contended that 
the higher radicality of innovation in market-based systems is an artifact of including the US in the 
sample, and showed this through data on patents and scholarly publications (both simple counts and 
citations-weighted). Along with patent citation counts, Akkermans et al. (2009) compared CMEs and 
LMEs using measures of generality (the “breadth” of innovation) and originality (the extent to which 
the innovation drew knowledge from other innovations). The claimed that LMEs enjoy a comparative 
advantage in radical innovation is only confirmed in some industries; some CMEs specialize in 
industries that are in their “radical” life-cycle stage.                                                           1 
 A third group of countries is also identified by Hall and Soskice with a mixed market economy (MME) model, or “Mediterranean capitalism”. These, too, bear similarities with credit-based economies. 
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The uncertain status of the Hall-Soskice hypothesis hints at the role of firm-level heterogeneity 
in making technological comparative advantage industry- but also firm-specific. Jackson and 
Miyajima (2007) argued that country-specific firm-level heterogeneity – in size, industry experience, 
capabilities, etc. - is so wide, that different varieties of capitalism (e.g. different financing patterns) can 
coexist within the same economy. Goutas and Lane (2009) showed that Anglo-Saxon models of 
corporate governance have been adapted by different German firms in quite idiosyncratic ways. And 
one can cite quite a few examples of Anglo-Saxon firms having a relation with finance akin the 
“corporatist” type. 
   
2.3 The myopia and weakness of market selection  
In credit-oriented systems, the existence of a tangled web of financial relationships suggests 
that product and financial markets should play a marginal role in selection across firms. The most 
productively efficient and profitable companies need not be those enjoying faster growth. Indeed, 
Coad (2007, 2010) found, through panel data analyses of French firms, that while employment growth 
and sales growth precede the growth of profits, higher profits do not translate in faster growth. 
Bottazzi et al. (2010) investigated the links between productivity, profitability, and growth on panels of 
Italian and French manufacturing firms, to similarly find that the estimated relationships between firm 
growth and profitability appear to be weak or not significant across countries and across industrial 
sectors.  
Bottazzi et al. (2006) exploited a financial rating index (ranked according to the expected 
ability to repay debt) to analyze a dataset of Italian firms in the period 1996-2003. Both very small and 
very large firm sizes are concentrated within high risk and less solvable firms. The same firms 
experience much more unstable growth records. While smaller firms are more likely constrained in 
raising external finance, larger firms face problems only when they are highly leveraged. Bottazzi et 
al. (2008) found non-trivial relationships between risk class and firm performance in a sample of 
Italian firms. The worse the credit conditions, the worse should profitability and productivity records 
be. Yet, one finds that badly rated (i.e. potentially credit-constrained) firms need not be among the 
worst performing, confirming the inefficiency of the credit market as a selection mechanism. 
In Bottazzi et al. (2014), financial constraints, measured through low credit ratings, upset the 
ability of large firms to exploit positive effects from diversification. A loss reinforcing effect is 
observed at two levels: on the one hand, firms who are already witnessing a reduction in sales see their 
performance worsen in the presence of financial constraints. On the other hand, firms experiencing 
positive growth rates are likely to see their growth potentials depressed if they meet their financial 
constraints (“pinioning the wings” effect). This evidence is more common across younger firms and 
results in a net loss in growth opportunities. 
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It is however illuminating to learn that the same evidence as Bottazzi et al. (2010) is found in 
countries as diverse as France, Germany, UK, and the USA by Dosi et al. (2015). Market selection 
forces – as mediated by differential profitabilities - are weak in market-oriented systems (UK, USA) 
just as in credit-based economies (France, Germany). Moreover, as Bianchini et al. (2014) show,  
persistent high-growth performances do not appear to be correlated with systematically different 
financial conditions, concerning interest payments and leverage levels, in a set of countries 
characterized by different financial systems, such as France, Italy, Spain, and the UK. For those not 
taking it as supporting evidence for the far-fetched Modigliani-Miller theorem, this hints at the 
possible irrelevance of finance below the rationing constraints. 
The absence of a solid relationship between profitability and growth is verified in different 
financial and organizational set-ups and militates against the idea that profits, through investments, 
feed growth. Selection seems rather to occur within firms, under different operational channels (for 
instance the replacement of older production processes by better ones).  
Further evidence on entrepreneurial finance is consistent with the above insights. In stock 
market segments catering to small caps, IPO companies are assisted by specialized financial 
intermediaries, called nominated advisers or sponsors, who act as gatekeepers and regulators of the 
listed companies (see also Revest and Sapio 2013b, 2014, Hornok 2014, Posner 2009). Deregulating 
the listing process is supposed to magnify the role of markets in selecting among companies. Yet, since 
Pagano et al. (1998), it is rather clear that capital raising is not the main reason behind the going 
public decision (see also Brau and Fawcett, 2006). Comparing listed and unlisted US companies, 
Asker et al. (2015) show that listed firms invest less than their privately-held counterparts, and their 
investments are less sensitive to growth opportunities. Revest and Sapio (2013a) reveal that a “junior” 
stock market in the London Stock Exchange group (i.e. the AIM) tends to attract companies with 
higher-than-average growth in operating revenues and assets, and has nurtured the growth of 
employees of its listed companies; but such growth has not translated into superior value added 
growth, causing listed companies to underperform in productivity terms. It appears that even when 
markets pick relatively promising companies, the post-IPO real performance – and the associated 
learning - can be disappointing.  
Reliance on specialized investors catering to startups, such as venture capitalists, apparently 
has not improved the quality of market selection. One of the defining features of venture capital (VC) 
is its claimed provision of advice in strategic decision-making, in technological synergies and business 
contacts, as well as in recruiting key employees (Hellmann and Puri 2002; Dushnitsky 2006; Ernst 
et al. 2005; Maula et al. 2005). The diffusion of VC is highly asymmetric across financial systems, 
with market-oriented systems such as US and UK playing the lion's part, as shown by Revest and 
Sapio (2012) and references therein. However, VC may flourish in systems more inclined to foster 
learning if VC plays a coach function, while a positive effect of VC funding on firm growth may be 
due to VC acting as a scout, which would be more expected in systems favoring selective pressure. 
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The evidence so far is mixed. In a sample of companies listed on the Euro.NM circuit, Bottazzi and 
Da Rin (2002) failed to find any significant effect of venture capital funds on employment and sales 
growth, despite controlling for endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity. Works by Baum and 
Silverman (2004) on Canada (a market-based system) and by Colombo and Grilli (2010) and Bertoni 
et al. (2011) on Italy (a credit-based system) show that real performance in venture-backed firms is 
mainly guided by learning efforts, as they provide evidence that venture capitalists perform essentially 
a coaching function. According to Engel and Keilbach (2007), German venture-backed firms display 
faster employment growth than their non-venture-backed peers after controlling for endogeneity, 
showing that venture capitalists are both coaches and scouts. The quantile regression estimates by 
Audretsch and Lehmann (2004) on German companies listed on the Neuer Markt reveal that venture 
capital improves the growth performance for the average firm, but not for the fast growers.  
 It is also worthwhile recalling that with dispersed shareholding, even a financial system 
centered on equity may prove less transparent than a credit-based system to outside investors (Bhide 
1993), notwithstanding the formally stronger investor protection offered in the Anglo-Saxon legal 
frameworks. But then, what selects across firms? The most enticing conjecture, in our view, is that 
product market selection across firms is there but operates with a lot of noise and relatively weakly, 
especially when firms are diversified and operate on different markets (more in Dosi et al., 2015). 
Conversely, in market-based, but increasingly also in (ex?) credit-based systems, financial markets 
may perform fast and deep, but according to criteria that are not correlated or even anti-correlated with 
the performance of firms in terms of growth (and innovation). And this is matched by strategies 
followed by non-financial firms to seek quick returns, no matter the long-term consequences (see 
Section 3).  
 
2.4 Patenting for finance 
One instance of how corporate strategies have shifted their focus from product to financial 
markets comes from the literature on patents. Firm-level empirical studies dealing with the impact of 
finance on innovation have multiplied in recent years (see for instance Aghion et al., 2013; Chava et 
al., 2013; Ferreira et al., 2014), often measuring innovation as the number of patents or the number of 
patent citations (see also Mann, 2015 and for a review Kerr and Nanda, 2014). Some results from this 
literature are interpreted as supporting the superiority of market-based systems in fostering innovation 
(Hsu et al., 2014). Importantly, though, the literature on Intellectual Property Rights has shown the 
strategic use of patent applications, sometimes even highlighting harmful effects from the proliferation 
of patents, such as the “patent thicket” phenomena (Shapiro, 2001), amplifying anti-commons 
dynamics (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; see also the analysis in Levin et al., 1987; Dosi and Stiglitz, 
2014). 
 Patents may be a revealing albeit noisy proxy for product market innovation, but may be also 
a part of a “signaling strategy” for the financial markets, irrespectively of the intrinsic innovative value 
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of patents themselves. Few recent studies deserve to be mentioned in this respect as they provide 
insights on the “ultimate” role of patents. Recent results tend to show that the latter are increasingly 
used as debt collateral in large companies (Mann, 2015; see also Hochberg et al., 2014). Since 2003, 
16% of the aggregate stock of patents at the USPTO has been pledged as collateral, while companies 
with patent-backed debt have performed over 40% of USPTO patenting (Mann, 2015). Firms with 
significant patent activity tend to receive cheaper bank loans than peers (Chava et al., 2013). Another 
side of the story refers to the interactions between patents and stock market valuation. Bernstein 
(2015) examined the impact for innovative firms of being listed on the Nasdaq2. He found that the 
number of patents filed declined after the Nasdaq IPO (compared with otherwise similar private 
firms). Together, there is a sizable decline of about 40% in innovation novelty, measured by patent 
citations. In addition, the new listed firms are often faced with the departure of the most competent 
inventors, and with a decline of the productivity of the investors that stay. Finally, the listed firms 
engage more easily in external innovation than privately-held firms, acquiring a substantial number of 
patents through M&A. These results suggest that already that weak form of financialization implied by 
“going public” has an effect - and a negative one indeed - on the innovative efforts. While Bernstein 
(2015) interprets this as evidence of agency costs and the related managerial incentives, in our view 
this evidence illustrates very well the strategic use of patents to achieve a Nasdaq listing. It is quite 
remarkable that credit-based economies witness very similar phenomena when market-based 
institutions are imported. Engel and Keilbach (2007) found that venture capital funding did not 
enhance post-investment innovativeness in a sample of German firms, essentially because venture 
capital more likely flows to companies with higher ex-ante patent counts.  
Interestingly, results in Benfratello et al. (2008) on Italian firms prove that innovation can be 
supported by credit-based systems as well. Relying on firm-level data over the 1990s, the authors 
underline a positive and significant effect of banking development on the probability that local firms 
introduce process or product innovation. The effect is more sizable for small firms and for firms in 
high-tech sectors.   
 
2.5 Finance might matter less matters for industrial dynamics than real factors, but…   
Overall, the foregoing empirical results make it hard to discriminate among financial systems with 
regards to their Schumpeterian efficiency.  
 Let us start by remarking that a good deal of the expansion activities of incumbent firms is 
financed via retained cash flows (as shown by Fazzari et al., 1988, Fazzari and Petersen, 1993 and 
follow-ups),3 and so are most often R&D activities even in the US (Hall et al., 1998; Brown et al., 
                                                          2  The study covers the period 1983-2006/2009. 
3 
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2009; Brown and Petersen, 2009; see also Hall, 2002 for a review). As a consequence, on average, the 
institutional features of the financial system and the associated advantages and disadvantages of 
different forms of financing do not matter much in investment and R&D decisions. And, on average, 
real factors are also significant drivers of firm growth and firm defaults. So, productivity differentials 
are an important (although not overwhelming) determinant of differential output growth (cf. Bottazzi 
et al., 2010 and Dosi et al., 2015). 
 Moreover, as Bottazzi et al. (2011) show, when firm default models are made to include both  
financial variables and real predictors, including productivity, profitability, size and growth variables, 
one finds, in the case of Italian limited liability manufacturing companies, that defaulting firms are on 
average more financially exposed, but they are also less productive and less profitable in all the years 
before the default occurs. And conversely, higher levels of productivity and profitability reduce the 
probability of default.   
 However, in evolutionary worlds, the tails are crucial, and on the tail, finance is quite 
important, both in the good and in the bad. As already mentioned in Section 2.2, a tail of “good” well-
performing firms are led to bankruptcy by primarily financial reasons. Moreover, it is the tail of young 
(and thus generally smaller) firms which are affected by the challenge of getting financed.  This has 
been partly met especially in the last three decades by resorting to equity finance both in market-based 
countries (US, UK) and in credit-based ones (Germany), partly as the outcome of an increasing 
institutional variety going under the tag “entrepreneurial finance”, which includes venture capital, 
private equity, business angels, and crowdfunding (Mina and Lahr, 2015). In any event, the preference 
for equity over loans does not seem to be a foundational feature of market-based systems. As Berger 
and Udell (1998) suggest, which priority of financing is adopted depends on industry-specific or firm-
specific traits, such as experience and collateralisable assets. Moreover, the reliance on equity vs. debt 
does not tell anything about the “patience” of the financial investment, which as we shall discuss 
below is crucial in shaping the rates and directions of innovative search. 
 
3.  Financialization in general, and the Maximising Shareholder Value (MSV) 
principle, in particular   
Since the 1980s, the economies have undergone a process commonly known as 
financialization, reaveled at a very first approximation by the fast overgrowth of finance as compared 
to all real sectors of the economy, alarmingly alike the spread of a tumor. The financialization process 
testifies to “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial 
institutions” (Epstein, 2005, p.3). Financialization has also been defined in the literature as a “pattern 
                                                                                                                                                                                      See also the debate between Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) and Fazzari et al. (2000), and the review in Whited (2006). 
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of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels, then through trade and 
commodity production" (Krippner, 2005, p. 174), and as a change in the regime of profit accumulation 
that signals the transition from managerial capitalism to an investor capitalism (Boyer, 2000; 2005; 
Foster, 2007; Guttmann, 2015 among others).  
Whereas there is increasing evidence that financialization has affected the economy at various 
levels (expansion of the financial industry, new corporate strategies, new employee compensation 
schemes), two important issues remain under-explored: i) has financialization transformed the 
relationships between finance, innovation and growth, and through which channels? ii) has 
financialization altered the properties of the two financial system archetypes, credit-based versus 
market-based, and by what specific means? Without any ambition to offer a full answer to these 
questions, we first review some facets of the financialization process, and then we discuss the so-
called principle of “maximizing shareholder value” which illustrates very well the impact of 
financialization on firm-level innovative behaviors. 
 
3.1 Financialization patterns 
There are several meanings to the term “financialization”, depending also on the level of analysis and 
of the financial mechanism under focus (see Krippner 2005 and Van der Zwan 2014 for reviews).   
Broadly speaking, financialization can be linked to the increasing economic and political 
power of a particular class, the “rentiers”, sustaining, as documented by Dore (2008), “the equity 
culture”, i.e. the active promotion of equity ownership by governments that has started in the Anglo-
Saxon economies in the 1980s. The ideology supporting such institutional transformation was and is 
based on the idea that stock market liquidity and capitalization stimulate innovation and economic 
growth. A concurrent theoretical support, reinforcing the above, can be be traced back to developments 
in a branch of the theory of finance, offering a set of sophisticated tools for the valuation of financial 
assets, notwithstanding their occasional disastrous results well before the 2008 crisis (cf. on the Black-
Scholes model, MacKenzie and Millo, 2003).  
Financialization has left its mark not only in Anglo-Saxon countries but also in other countries 
where norms, rules, and tools typical of market-based systems have been increasingly transplanted 
(see e.g. Vitols 2005 on Germany; Campbell and Pedersen 2007 on Denmark; Jackson and Miyajima 
2007 on Japan). Financial innovation has come in the form of new financial instruments (e.g. 
increasingly complex derivatives) and new trading venues (such as the multilateral trading facilities 
instituted by the MiFID directive in the European Union), fostered by innovation in ICT that allows 
e.g. high-frequency finance. Among financial innovations, securitization appears as a striking 
phenomenon that has played a major role during the financial crisis of 2008 (see for instance Davis 
and Kim 2015). “Securitization has notably changed the nature of the relationship between the lender 
and the borrower, shifting debt from a concrete relationship with an entity (a bank) to an abstract 
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connection with the financial market” (Ibid, p. 12). This process has gone along with an expansion of 
trading volumes, most strikingly in unregulated – and thus opaque – segments, as testified by the 
expansion in over-the-counter (OTC) trading, that amounted to $197 trillion in 2004 and increased to 
$516 trillions by June 2007 (Dore, 2008).   
 Simultaneously, the proportion of financial assets, stock equities or mutual funds, held by 
households expanded significantly (Keister, 2005; Fligstein and Goldstein, 2015). In the USA, since 
the 1980s the increasing involvement of households in stock market trading, directly or through the 
intermediation of mutual funds, has been actively promoted (Davis 2008), accompanied by specific 
measures such as tax deductions for non-listed equity, or by the shift from defined benefit to defined 
contribution pensions (such as 401k plans; see Hacker, 2004). As Van der Zwan (2014) put it, this is 
the financialization of everyday life.4 Together, the proportion of profits earned by financial 
corporations in the total has skyrocketed: in the USA, it was well below 10% in the 1950s, only to 
reach around 45% in the period immediately preceding the 2008 crisis. Not surprisingly, in the recent 
years the financial industry appears as the most profitable industry in the US (Kaplan and Rauh, 2010; 
Philippon and Reshef, 2013). 
 Closer to our research goals, and related to the above mentioned change in the balance of 
power, financialization seems to have hampered Schumpeterian efficiency, primarily by influencing 
the strategies of large firms (for empirical studies see Mazzucato and Tancioni, 2012; Leaver and 
Montalban, 2010; Lazonick and Sakinç, 2010; among others), whose governance has increasingly 
embodied the so-called principle of Maximizing Shareholder Value (MSV), ousting other stakeholders 
from the decisional processes of large corporations. 
 
3.2 The growing influence of the MSV principle  
Currently, several mechanisms interact in the financialization of large firms. Mergers and 
acquisitions have multiplied since the 1980s (Fligstein, 1993), as well as downsizing and sell off, 
driven by the adagio that « the whole was worth less than the sum of the parts » (Davis and Kim, 
2015, p. 12). During the same period, in the USA it has become easier for external investors to execute 
takeovers because of less stringent antitrust guidelines, changes in the anti-acquisition laws, and 
financial innovations, leading to a frantic market for corporate control (Davis and Stout, 1992).  
 In 1982, American corporations obtained the right to repurchase their own stocks, with 
disastrous consequences for the use of profits diverted from investment and research uses (Lazonick, 
                                                          4 
   Financialization seems to have also helped the stratification of the US population (Fligstein and Goldstein, 2015) with the upper middle class active on the financial market in order to maintain life styles, and the lower class increasingly hooked on borrowing. 
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2007; Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013). In addition, favorable corporate tax deductibility regimes 
foster the use of stock options in executive compensation, that in turn boosts the value of the shares. 
Hence, corporate executives are stimulated to manipulate stock prices in order to increase their 
compensations (Diprete et al., 2010; Zheng and Zhou, 2012). As a general trend, financialization has 
been characterized by a tremendous increase in financial pay-out ratios, in the form of interest 
payments, dividend payments, and stock buybacks (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). This tendency is 
labelled by the authors as a shift from “a retain and reinvest strategy” to a “downsize and distribute 
strategy”.  
The financialization of the corporation goes together with to the emergence of shareholder 
value as the main guiding principle of corporate behaviors. The MSV philosophy becomes dominant 
in the 1980s and puts the shareholders at the center of the corporate scene, theoretically grounded in 
Agency Theory à la Fama and Jensen (for discussions, see Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000;  Boyer, 
2005; Dobbin and Jung, 2010 among others). As known, in that view corporate efficiency is indeed 
equivalent to MSV (Fligstein and Shin, 2007) - needless to say, under conditions of informationally 
efficient markets. In such a world, maximizing the value of the firm and protecting the investors are 
the best ways to improve social welfare. Operationally, the MSV principle has also generated 
particular business practices through the introduction of specific financial performance indicators, 
such as return on equity, or the adoption of international accounting standards (see for instance 
Widmer, 2011). 
A crucial issue relates to the impact of the MSV principle on the real economy, and especially 
on the firm-level innovative efforts. The growing attention granted to the MSV has influenced the 
industrial organization, the internal organization of the firms and their strategies, often at the expense 
of growth, innovation, and employment. Evidence emerges from both the sociological and the 
economic studies.  
First, several scholars have pointed at the increase of the financial portfolio components of 
non-financial corporations since the 1980s (cf. from the more sociological camp, Krippner, 2005; 
Epstein and Jayadev, 2005; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2015). This increase has been the consequence 
of redirecting profits from production toward financial investments (Davis and Kim 2015). The 
peculiarity of the financialized corporation, indeed, is that financial gains are not re-invested in 
productive facilities, but distributed to shareholders, through dividend payouts and share buy-backs 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Lazonick, 2010).  
Second, firm-level case studies have shown that, during the late 1990s, top executives of major 
US high-tech corporations supported the speculative strategies of the investors, transforming market 
speculation into capital gains through stock options (Lazonick, 2007). Carpenter, Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan (2003) have also shown the extent to which the use of stock-based compensation made 
companies vulnerable during the crisis (in the case they consider, the Internet bubble). Several works 
have focused on the pharmaceutical sector. As shown by Mazzucato and Tancioni (2012), 
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pharmaceutical companies that invest more heavily in technology turn out to experience more stock 
return volatility. This comes as an additional justification to diverting resources towards purely 
financial investments, to the detriment of innovation. In the same sector, Leaver and Montalban (2010) 
illustrates how Sanofi, the French pharmaceutical company, in recent years has used the stock market 
in order to perform revenue consolidation, distribution, and repatriation. Pisano (2006) emphasizes the 
unprofitability of the US biotechnology industry throughout its recent history, while it has received 
large amounts of financial resources (including private and public equity and R&D contracts). The 
“Pisano Puzzle” has been interpreted through the role of speculative behaviors on stock markets, 
especially on the Nasdaq (Lazonick and Tulum, 2011). In the USA, both biotech firms and large 
pharmaceutical corporations have received huge amounts of government funding through the National 
Institute of Health (NIH), yet stock market speculation has disconnected the financial resources from 
their main purpose: innovation. Lazonick and Sakinç (2010) reveal that pharmaceutical firms may 
remain listed on the Nasdaq for years, raise huge amounts of capital through IPO and seasoned equity 
offers, without generating new products, while providing external R&D services. 
The negative influence of the MSV principle on innovative practices has been recently 
interpreted as a tension between creation and extraction in the innovation processes. The increasing 
separation between actors who take risks and actors receiving the rents from innovation lies behind 
such tension (Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013). On the value-creation side, “the collective character of 
the innovation process makes it difficult to measure the contribution of different actors to it, as their 
contributions are intertwined” (Ibid, p. 9), while it is much easier to appropriate value at the end of the 
process. Complex compensation mechanisms are devised in order to extract value, prominently 
including buy-backs (outside the pharmaceutical industry, see Lazonick, 2007 on Microsoft). A highly 
complementary dynamics regards the development of private equity, a hallmark of a market-oriented 
financial system: see Froud and Williams (2007) who interpret private equity as “a rearrangement of 
claims which allow value capture and value creation for a small number of principals (private equity 
principals and senior managers)”. In a way, private equity helps to institutionalize and normalize value 
extraction (see also Erturk et al., 2010). 
A key issue concerns the identity of the actors extracting value and the reasons behind their 
success. According to Lazonick and Mazzucato (2013), actors are highly diversified and include 
managers, venture capitalists, bankers, and hedge funds managers. These actors rely on the MSV 
principle: if they take the risk, they should receive a satisficing return on their investments. They act 
through different modes, such as lobbying behaviors on political decision-makers in order to access 
special grants. They use e.g. insider control over speculative stocks and others mechanisms such as 
stock-based compensation, legal manipulation of the stock market through stock buybacks, IPOs and 
acquisitions.  
 A way to identify more precisely at which level and how the value extraction occurs consists 
in examining the various functions performed by the stock markets. The “theory of the innovative 
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firm” provides a stimulating conceptual framework, throwing light on the distinct and interrelated 
functions performed by stock markets (Lazonick, 2007). In particular, the cash and compensation 
functions (and their interactions) appear to create greater opportunities for value extraction. The cash 
function means that by providing liquidity, the stock market broadens the array of ﬁnancial sources 
available to the listed companies. Compensation concerns the use of corporate stock as remuneration 
for employees and managers. Indeed, in the era of financialization, the “cash with compensation” 
functions appear to have become dominant at the expense of the other functions.5 
 
3.3 Short termism: what is the evidence? 
While the financialization process of the non-financial corporation is grounded on the spread 
of the MSV principle, it is also likely to yield short termism, that is the shortening of the horizon over 
which corporate strategies are planned. Yet, few empirical studies deal with this subject. Short termism 
has at least two dimensions: investors short termism, which has been extensively underlined by the 
literature on financialization, and managerial short termism. Regarding the latter, the vast majority of 
top executives recognize, in surveys, that they are ready to cut or delay investment to meet short term 
targets in the same quarter. 80% of survey participants in Graham et al. (2006) would decrease 
discretionary spending to meet an earning target. Meeting and beating earning benchmarks are clearly 
very important to CEOs. In other words, companies sacrifice long-term value in response to intense 
pressure from the market. Furthermore, managers who wish to leave the firm tend to be interested by 
an increase in the stock price as a favorable signal on the job market for executives.  
If it is frequently claimed that managers are myopic, but not much research has been done on 
the subject. Edmans et al. (2013) find that managerial short termism leads to reduction in real 
investments, including R&D, capital expenditures, and advertising expenses. The authors used the 
price sensitivity of equity vesting6 over the upcoming year.7 R&D is shown to be negatively associated 
                                                          5 
    The other functions performed by the market are creation, control, and combination. Creation indicates the ability of the stock market to encourage the ﬂow of ﬁnancial resources into new ﬁrm formation by providing a promise of liquidity at a later point in time. Control refers to the fact that, by aﬀecting ownership, the stock market exerts an inﬂuence on the relationship between corporate owners and the managerial staﬀ. Relatedly, combination concerns the property of corporate stock as currency in the transfers of the strategic control of ﬁrms, as in mergers and acquisitions. 
 
6 
    Vesting is the process by which an employee with a stock option becomes entitled to the benefits of ownership. The vesting schedule determines when an employee acquires full ownership (usually 3 to 5 years in the USA).  During the vesting period the employee cannot sell or transfer stock or options. 
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with the price sensitivity of stocks and options that vest over the same year. Vesting equity increases 
the CEO stock price concerns, but it is not correlated with investment opportunities. For their part, 
Ladika and Sautner (2015) show that the new US accountant regulation FAR 123R induces firms to 
accelerate the vesting period of option grants and such vesting leads to a reduction in capital 
expenditure. Generally, when vesting periods are short, the probability that executives try and boost 
short-term performance is higher.8 
One attempt to establish a connection between financialization, short termism and real 
investment decisions of firms has been proposed by Orhaganzi (2008) in a study on US firms between 
1973 and 2003, which shows that increased financialization affects real investments of non-financial 
corporations. The effects involve two channels. First, high financial profit opportunities lead to higher 
financial investments that tend to crowd out real investments and modify the managerial incentives. 
Second, the pressure to increase financial payout ratios (interest payments, dividend payments and 
stock buybacks) results in lower levels of ‘real’ investment9. In both cases, increased payout ratios and 
increased financial investments contribute to shorten the planning horizon of the non-financial firms.  
Certainly, more research is needed on the subject, going back also to direct measures of the 
payback periods according to which firms decide to undertake or not their investments in fixed capital 
and R&D projects. An early example is found in Mansfield (1988), whose comparative study of R&D 
in Japan and the USA shed light on the shorter payback period for Japanese product and process 
innovations based on external technology. 
 
3.4 Different archetypes do not match the historical evidence regarding investor protection 
One major tenet of the MSV, emphasized by Law and Finance literature, is the necessity to 
protect investors in order to stimulate financial development (La Porta et al. 1997; 2000). However, 
comparative business and institutional history is at odds with such a notion. 
Business historians show that in the past, the absence of laws offering investor protection did 
not impede the emergence and growth of stock markets (Mayer, 2008; Musacchio and Turner, 2013)10. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         The sensitivity is determined by equity grants made several years before and not linked to current investment opportunities. 
 
8 
    Recent empirical studies analyze the impact of short termism on innovation through patent data, but with the limitations of patents as innovation indicators that we have already mentioned (see Gao et al., 2014) 
 
9  The negative effect of increased financial payout ratios is more pronounced for large firms. 
10  See Business History (2013) : “Special Issue on Law and Finance: A Business History Perspective”, coordinated by Musacchio and Turner. 
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During the first half of the 20th century, the UK operated a large and dynamic stock market without 
legal investor protection, and with already a sizable number of acquisitions (Franks et al., 2009). UK 
firms were very active in terms of acquisitions, and while they issued new shares to acquire other 
firms, they diluted the shareholding of the directors and the founders. Additionally, even without 
investor protection, insider trading in the UK stock markets was very moderate, and the separation of 
ownership from control did not harm shareholders (Campbell and Turner; 2011; Braggion and Moore 
2013; Foreman-Peck and Hannah, 2013).  
In Germany, at the beginning of the 20th century, the new equity issuance was largely invested 
in shares taken in other firms, but not under the form of firm acquisitions (Franks et al., 2006). 
Concentration of ownership did not decline, because banks maintained a large weight in the capital of 
the companies listed on the stock market. Equity finance was intermediated at this period in Germany, 
both by companies and banks. Another illustration concerns Japan. In the early 20th century, the 
Japanese stock markets were characterized by high ownership dispersion. Later, under the influence of 
the United States and after World War II, the legal framework has been transformed towards a tougher 
protection of investor rights (Franks et al., 2014). Nevertheless, at the same time banks and companies 
had preserved cross shareholdings, which rose up against a regulation that strongly favored dispersed 
ownership.  
Overall, Mayer (2008) concluded that at the beginning of the 20th century the development of 
various stock markets was not stimulated by investor protection, but by institutional set-ups including  
well structured boards and, above all, trust relationships. In turn, trust was facilitated by the proximity 
between investors and directors (Musacchio and Turner, 2013; Braggion and Moore, 2013; Cheffin et 
al., 2013). In the UK, local stock markets and local investors were very central to support trust and 
encourage the growth of the market, while in Germany banks holding capital shares were playing a 
substantial intermediary role. In Japan, stock market trading relied on respected and prominent 
members of the business community (business coordinators) and of the Zaibatsu families.  
Throughout the history of stock markets, the evidence teaches that the centrality of investors 
and investor protection have been neither necessary nor sufficient conditions to the mobilization of 
financial resources for corporate growth. 
  
Conclusion: some assessments on the evolutionary properties of the current financial 
system  
In this work, we have tried to assess the solidity of some propositions on the evolutionary 
properties of different financial regimes, put forward in Dosi (1990), in light of 25 years of financial 
innovation and institutional reform. Indeed, they turn out to be more controversial than one believed.  
First: “The more a system is ‘market based’, the more it will increase environmental 
selection”. This appears to be less the case as one thought at the time or, rather, market selection is 
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highly imperfect even in market-based systems. The empirical micro evidence, then not available, 
suggests that irrespectively of financial regimes, “learning” dominates “selection” as a determinant of 
firm growth. Moreover, due to the financialization process, financial markets might have become more 
important than product markets as “selectors” among companies, but if they are, they do so along 
criteria of short term returns. All of this deteriorates both static and Schumpeterian efficiency, an 
insight that is now palatable even to mainstream economists, and more so after the last financial crisis. 
Second: “Market based system seem to be more conducive to the exploration of new 
technological paradigms”. The empirical evidence produced in the last decades suggests that 
innovation radicality changes more across industries than across financial systems; that innovation 
outcomes, such as patents, are increasingly conceived as strategic weapons to access financial markets, 
somewhat reverting the expected causality channel. More generally there appear to be a de-link 
between the determinants of innovation and growth, on the one hand, and the performance of firms on 
the financial markets. As argued by Mazzucato (2013) and Lazonick and Mazzucato (2013), value 
extraction behaviors on stock markets negatively influence the exploration of new technological 
paradigms and even search within known paradigms: there is “in modern capitalist economies, an 
increasing separation between those economic actors that take the risk of investing in innovation and 
those who reap the rewards from innovation” (Ibid, p. 2). The dominance of the philosophy of 
Maximization of Shareholder Value offers the general blessing to the value extraction process. In 
addition, short-termist behaviors make the situation worse, because the very nature of the innovation 
process “creates a time lag between the bearing of risk and the generation of returns” (Ibid, p. 9). 
Third: “The more knowledge is asymmetric, appropriable and scarce, the more 
institutionalized processes of finance allocation will be conducive to evolutionary viability.”.  
Historical evidence suggests that in order to finance innovation and sustain growth, the distinction 
between the two archetypes in not so clearcut. Conversely, the financialization process has contributed 
to compress and somewhat degrade the specific properties of the finance-innovation nexus in both 
financial systems. 
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